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Abstract
We develop a ﬁnancial market trading model in the tradition of Glosten
and Milgrom (1985) that allows us to incorporate non-trivial volume. We
observe that in this model price volatility is positively related to the trading
volume and to the absolute value of the net order ﬂow, i.e. the order imbalance.
Moreover, higher volume leads to higher order imbalances. These ﬁndings are
consistent with well-established empirical ﬁndings. Our model further predicts
that higher trader participation and systematic improvements in the quality
of traders’ information lead to higher volume, larger order imbalances, lower
market depth, shorter duration, and higher price volatility.
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An important empirical regularity is that price volatility is positively related to trading
volume and to the order imbalance (i.e. the absolute diﬀerence between the volumes of
buy and sell orders); see Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002) for a comprehensive
list of references or Karpoﬀ (1987) for earlier studies. Volume is generated by trading
activity, which is commonly explained by diversiﬁcation and hedging motives, liquidity
needs, or asymmetric information. Order imbalances occur either by chance or because
of diverging opinions, which are often the result of heterogenous information.
Focussing on the information motive, we develop a model to study the impact of non-
trivial volume on prices. A key feature of our model is the parsimonious formulation
of traders’ information. It allows us to study how changes in the underlying information
environment inﬂuence market activity. The economic questions that can then be addressed
range from the impact of regulatory changes, such as regulation Fair Disclosure, to the
eﬀect of improvements in data processing technology. For instance, do such changes
increase or decrease price volatility and do they lead to more or less trading?
Our model combines features of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985) and has
the following structure. Liquidity is supplied by an uniformed, risk-neutral and competi-
tive market maker (or dealer). Demanders of liquidity either trade for reasons outside the
model (e.g., to rebalance their portfolio or inventory), or they have private information
about the fundamental value of the security. Speciﬁcally, informed traders receive private
binary signals of heterogenous precisions, or qualities. There is a continuum of possible
qualities, and the quality of trader i’s signal is i’s private information. Traders ﬁrst post
market orders. The dealer observes the order ﬂow, sets a price that aggregates the infor-
mation contained in it, and takes positions to clear the market if there is an imbalance
between buys and sales. In equilibrium, the price is set so that traders buy (sell) if their
private signal is suﬃciently encouraging (discouraging).
As in Kyle (1985) or Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988), traders post their orders simulta-
neously, which allows us to analyze the behavior of volume and order imbalances. As in
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) traders are restricted to post orders of unit size. Combining
unit trades with the continuous information structure allows us to concisely characterize
the equilibrium by the marginal buyer’s and seller’s signal qualities.
Further, our setup allows for random variations in the number of traders and het-
erogeneity in people’s ability to process information, which are essential characteristics
of changes in market access or disclosure requirements. Tractably capturing these as-
pects within existing frameworks, such as Kyle (1985) or Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988), is
challenging, because the linear structure of the equilibrium in these models relies on the
1common knowledge of the number of traders and their signal precisions.1
In the equilibrium of our model some informed traders choose not to trade because
their information is not suﬃciently “reliable”. We can thus study and quantify the no-
transaction rate. This rate is loosely related to the time passage between transactions,
or duration, a measure of transaction costs that has recently gained attention in the
literature (see, for instance, Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2005)).
As a ﬁrst step in our analysis, we verify that our model is consistent with the afore-
mentioned, common empirical ﬁndings on the relations among the observables, namely,
that price volatility is positively related to both, the trading volume and the order im-
balance. Investigating the behavior of the order ﬂow, we ﬁnd that a higher volume leads
to a higher order imbalance. These results lend credibility to our model, showing that it
can serve as a conceptual framework for understanding and predicting trader behavior in
a dealer market.
The intuition for this ﬁrst set of results stems from the informational setup. In equi-
librium, actions are more likely to be “correct” because signals are informative. Thus the
more trades there are, the more “correct” rather than “wrong” decisions there are. This
raises the expected order imbalance and leads to a higher price volatility.
A further testable implication of our model is that an increase in the time t−1 net
order ﬂow increases the expectation of the asset value, hence the expected time t number
of traders with favorable information and the expected time t net order ﬂow. In other
words, in our model buys generate the expectation of more buys so that there is expected
momentum in behavior.
After establishing the core relations among major observable variables, we move on to
employ our framework to shed light on how structural shifts in markets aﬀect the major
observable variables. We ﬁrst explore the behavior of prices and volume as the arrival
rate of traders increases. Our model predicts that any event resulting in a higher aver-
age number of active traders, such as the advent of internet-based trading, will increase
volume, the order imbalance and price volatility, and it will lower duration.
Next, we investigate the implications of an improvement in the traders’ information
quality. Such an improvement can occur, for instance, when a company adopts or a
regulator imposes a new disclosure policy that fosters transparency.2 Our model predicts
that, ceteris paribus, stocks of companies with such new policies should exhibit higher
1As Kyle (1985) and Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988) provide the foundation for a large strand of the
dealer market literature, we will comment in detail on the relation of our results to theirs in Sections IV
and V to highlight the marginal contribution of our work.
2Related to this are many examples of incremental or even dramatic improvements in economy-wide
information quality, such as the advent of new data sources or new computing tools that allow faster
processing of data. Our model then delivers testable predictions for event studies of such changes.
2volume, higher order imbalances, and higher price volatility.
The key feature that admits such a comparative analysis is our informational setup.
Focussing on families of quality distributions that are ordered in a ﬁrst order stochastic
dominance sense, we identify a complementarity between the overall and the marginal
trader’s information: as the aggregate quality increases, traders require signals of higher
precision to be willing to trade. Intuitively, a ﬁrst-order shift in information quality leads
to a larger fraction of informed traders who have high quality information. This implies
that prices are more informative and the relative disadvantage of the less well informed
traders is smaller. At the same time, however, a higher average quality increases adverse
selection costs and thus reduces “market depth”, so that the price is more sensitive to
each trade. A previously marginal trader now faces prices that, given his information,
react too strongly to orders and he thus abstains from trading.
At ﬁrst sight, the impact on volume appears ambiguous: when the marginal buyer
has higher quality information, the fraction of people who trade may increase or decrease.
Imposing more structure on the quality distribution in the form of a tighter technical
monotonicity condition, we show that the probability of an informed trade increases as the
overall information quality improves. This eﬀect also leads to an increase in the expected
trading volume. The expected order imbalance follows suit: a higher marginal trading
quality implies that a smaller fraction of traders take the “wrong” action. Consequently, a
larger fraction of traders will trade in the “right” direction, skewing the order imbalance.
Combining the eﬀect of the larger price impact of each transaction with the increase
in trading volume, we ﬁnd that price variability also increases. Finally, the mechanism
that causes improvements in information quality to increase volume will increase the
transaction rate and thus decrease duration.
Our framework admits an alternative way of modeling an improvement in information
quality in the market by increasing the probability that any given trader is privately
informed. Yet, we show that the equilibrium eﬀects of such an increase are at odds with
empirical ﬁndings: a higher probability of a trader being uninformed leads to higher
volume but lower price volatility. Information structure shifts, on the other hand, do
yield the empirically observed relation (higher volume and higher price volatility) and
thus provide a better interpretation of empirical ﬁndings.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines our trading
model. Section III derives the trading equilibrium. Section IV discusses the evolution of
prices and the impact of volume on the order imbalance and price variability. Section V
discusses the comparative statics with respect to entry rates and information structures.
Section VI concludes. Most proofs are in the appendix.
3II The Basic Setup
A Overview of the Trading Process.
Liquidity is supplied by an uniformed, risk-neutral and competitive dealer. Liquidity de-
manders either have private information about the fundamental value of the security, or
they trade for reasons outside the model (e.g. portfolio or inventory rebalancing, diversi-
ﬁcation). Trade is restricted to unit lots of a single asset.
A random number of traders enter the market simultaneously. Informed traders try to
predict the transaction price after receiving their information, and thus determine whether
or not it is worthwhile to submit a market order. The dealer observes all orders and then
sets a price that reﬂects her information.3 All orders clear at a single price; the dealer
absorbs the net order ﬂow (the number of buys minus sales) in such a manner that she
makes zero expected proﬁts on her position.
Uncertain transaction prices are common in real markets, a few examples being:
(a) dealer markets, such as forex and bond-markets (until recently), where liquidity de-
mand precedes liquidity supply so that the clearing price is unknown at the time of the
order submission; (b) trades that clear on an upstairs market;4 (c) trades during the
opening session on stock markets; (d) very fast moving markets or markets where the
time from placing a market order to its execution is suﬃciently long.5
B Model Details
Security: There is a single risky asset with a liquidation value V from a set of two
potential values V = {V ,V } ≡ {0,1}. The two values are equally likely, Pr(V ) = 1/2,
and this prior distribution over V is common knowledge.6
Traders: There is an inﬁnitely large pool of traders, out of which a random num-
ber Nt ≥ 0 of people are drawn in period t according to a Poisson distribution with
parameter ν. Each trader can buy or sell one round lot (one unit) of the security at
prices determined by the dealer, or he can be inactive. As in Glosten and Milgrom
3In what follows we will refer to the dealer as female and to traders as male.
4There may be prior price indications, but the deﬁnitive transaction price is only pinned down when
the order is placed. Often large institutional traders instruct their trading department to acquire (or
sell) x shares “cheapest” (“highest”). The trading department approaches its ﬂoor broker or an upstairs
trader, who then helps work the order.
5Even with access to tick-to-tick data (for instance as oﬀered by NASDAQ’s INET), a retail investor
faces a time gap between posting an order and trade execution. Another example is ordering in the
immediate aftermarket of an IPO when price uncertainty is large.
6As will be clear from the subsequent analysis, the assumption of an equal prior is without loss of
generality.
4(1985), each trader can trade at most once, immediately upon entering. Traders can post
only market orders. The set of possible actions is thus {buy,no trade,sell}.
Each trader is equipped with private information with probability   ∈ (0,1); if not
informed, a trader becomes a noise trader (probability 1 −  ). The informed traders are
risk neutral and rational, and they choose an action to maximize their expected trading
proﬁts. Noise traders buy and sell with equal probability; to simplify the exposition, we
assume that they always trade. They are not necessarily irrational, but they trade for
reasons outside of this model, such as liquidity.7
Market and timing: There are t = 1,...,T time periods. At each t, Nt traders
enter the market and post their orders simultaneously to the dealer. The latter is risk
neutral and competitive; upon observing the order ﬂow, she sets a zero-expected proﬁt
market price.
C Information
The structure of the model is common knowledge among all market participants. The
identity of a trader and his signal are private information, but everyone can observe the
history of trades and transaction prices. “No-trades” by their very nature are unob-
servable, consequently neither is the total number of traders in the market. The public
information Ht at date t > 1 is the sequence of numbers of buys and sales together with the
realized transaction prices at all dates prior to t: Ht = ((b1,s1,p1),...,(bt−1,st−1,pt−1)),
where bτ,sτ and pτ are the numbers of buys and sales and the realized transaction price
respectively at date τ < t. H1 refers to the initial history before trades occurred. The
numbers of informed and noise traders at time t and qualities of informed traders’ infor-
mation are independent of the past history Ht and the underlying fundamental V .
Dealer. The dealer’s information at date t consists of the public history Ht, the
number of buy orders bt and the number of sell orders st posted at time t.
Informed Traders’ information. We follow most of the GM sequential trading
literature and assume that traders receive a binary signal about the true liquidation
value V . These signals are private, and they are independently distributed, conditional
on the true value V . Speciﬁcally, informed trader i is told “with chance qi, the liquidation
7Assuming the presence of noise traders is common practice in the literature on microstructure with
























































Figure 1: Signals, Signal Qualities and Noise Trading. This ﬁgure illustrates the
mechanics of our signal distribution: ﬁrst, it is determined whether a trader is informed
(probability  ) or noise (probability 1 −  ). If informed, the signal quality is determined
next. The trader receives the “correct” signal with probability qi and the “wrong” signal
with probability 1−qi. (The draw of the state V is identical for all agents.) If the trader
is a noise trader, then he will buy or sell with equal probability.
value is High/Low (h/l)” where
Pr(signal|true value) V = 0 V = 1
signal = l qi 1 − qi
signal = h 1 − qi qi
This qi is the signal quality. In contrast to most of the GM literature, we assume that
there is a continuum of signal qualities and that qi is trader i’s private information. The
distribution of qualities is independent of the asset’s true value and can be understood as
reﬂecting, for instance, the distribution of traders’ talents to analyze securities. Figure 1
illustrates the distribution of noise and informed traders and the information structure.
In what follows, we will combine the binary signal (h or l) and its quality on [1/2,1] in a









Figure 2: Plots of Belief Densities and Distributions. Left Panel: The densities
of beliefs for an example with uniformly distributed qualities. The densities for beliefs
conditional on the true state being 1 and 0 respectively are f1(π) = 2π and f0(π) = 2(1−
π). Right Panel: The corresponding conditional distribution functions are F1(π) = π2
and F0(π) = 2π − π2.
is high (V = 1). This belief is the trader’s posterior on V = 1 after he learns his quality
and sees his private signal but before he observes the public history. A trader’s behavior
given his private signal and its quality can then be equivalently described in terms of the
trader’s private belief. This approach allows us to characterize the equilibrium in terms
of a continuous scalar variable (as opposed to a vector of traders’ private information)
and thus simpliﬁes the exposition.
Trader i’s private belief is obtained by Bayes Rule and coincides with the signal quality
if the signal is h, πi = Pr(V = 1|h) = qi/(qi + (1 − qi)) = qi. Likewise, πi = 1 − qi if the
signal is l. In what follows we will use the distribution of these private beliefs. Denote the
density of beliefs f1(π) if the true state is V = 1 and by f0(π) if the true state is V = 0.
Appendix A ﬂeshes out how these densities are obtained from the underlying distribution
of qualities.
Example of private beliefs. Figure 2 depicts an example where the signal qual-
ity q is uniformly distributed. The uniform distribution implies that the density of individ-
uals with signals of quality q ∈ [1/2,1] is g(q) = 2q. In state V = 1, private beliefs π ≥ 1/2
are held by traders who receive high (h) signals of quality q = π, private beliefs π ≤ 1/2
are held by traders who receive low (l) signals of quality q = 1−π. Thus, in state V = 1,
the density of private beliefs π for π ∈ [1/2,1] is given by f1(π) = Pr(h|V = 1,q = π)g(q =
π) = 2π, and for π ∈ [0,1/2] it is given by f1(π) = Pr(l|V = 1,q = 1−π)g(q = 1−π) = 2π.
Similarly, the density conditional on V = 0 is f0(π) = 2(1 − π). The distributions of pri-
vate beliefs are then F1(π) = π2 and F0(π) = 2π − π2. Figure 2 further illustrates that
signals are informative: recipients in favor of state V = 0 are more likely to occur in this
state than in state V = 1.
7D The Trading Equilibrium
Traders who arrive at the same time do not observe each other’s actions. Consequently,
when posting the order, a trader does not know the transaction price.
The pricing rule: The dealer is competitive and receives zero expected proﬁts.
Consequently, given the public history Ht, bt buy orders and st sell orders posted at time
t, the price at date t is
(1) pt = E[V |bt,st,Ht].
This equilibrium pricing rule is common knowledge.8
The informed trader’s optimal choice: An informed trader enters the market in
period t, receives his private signal and observes history Ht. He submits a buy order if,
conditional on his information and his own buy-decision, the expected transaction price
is at or below his expectation of the asset’s liquidation value; likewise for a sell order. He
abstains from trading if he expects to make negative trading proﬁts.
The equilibrium concept. We will restrict attention to monotone and symmetric
decision rules for traders. Namely, we assume that an informed trader uses a “threshold”
rule: he buys if his private belief πi is at or above the time-t buy threshold πt, πi ≥ πt,
he sells if πi ≤ πt ≤ πt, and he abstains from trading otherwise. The rules are symmetric
in the sense that all informed traders use the same threshold decision rule.
Moreover, we will consider only equilibria in which people have no ex-post regrets. In
such equilibria, a trader would not wish to change his trading decision upon observing the
order ﬂow. This no-regrets property is commonly attained in other settings. For instance,
it is an equilibrium feature of setups where agents submit demand-supply schedules such
as a rational expectations equilibrium (e.g. Grossman (1976)). With a regret free equi-
librium, the unobservability of the transaction price is benign. Such an equilibrium need
not exist, but we show that it does and that it is tractable.9
The price set by the dealer given the action proﬁles for the informed traders is referred
to as the equilibrium price.
8This equilibrium pricing rule is analogous to Kyle (1985), but there is a subtle diﬀerence, as we allow
the dealer to see all orders, whereas in Kyle, she observes only the aggregate order ﬂow.
9Any regret free equilibrium is also a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE), but the converse is not
true. Thus the existence of a regret-free equilibrium is not guaranteed by standard game theoretic results.
A regret free equilibrium requires no ex-post losses, implying the PBE condition that there are no ex
ante expected losses, by the Law of Iterated Expectations.
8III Equilibrium Prices and Behavior
A Pricing and Decision Rules
When the asset’s liquidation value is high, V = 1, a given trader will buy with probability
(1 −  )/2 +  (1 − F1(πt)), sell with probability (1 −  )/2 +  F1(πt), and not trade with
probability  (F1(πt) − F1(πt)), also accounting for noise traders’ actions. To compress
notation, for v ∈ {0,1} we write these probabilities as follows βv,t := Pr(buy|V = v,Ht),
σv,t := Pr(sale|V = v,Ht), and γv,t := Pr(no trade|V = v,Ht).
The probability that a given trader is informed is independent of other agents’ iden-
tities and the asset’s liquidation value. Moreover, private beliefs are independent condi-
tional on the asset value. Consequently, traders’ actions are independent, conditional on
the asset value.
The dealer’s pricing rule. Suppose the dealer observes bt buy orders and st sell
orders. The dealer then revises her belief by Bayes’ Rule and sets the zero-expected proﬁt
price
(2) pt(bt,st) = E[V |bt,st,Ht] =
Pr(bt,st|V = 1,Ht)pt
Pr(bt,st|V = 1,Ht)pt + Pr(bt,st|V = 0,Ht)(1 − pt)
,
where pt is the public belief that the state is high after history Ht, pt = Pr(V = 1|Ht). To
simplify the exposition, we will from now on omit the t subscripts and history Ht when
possible without ambiguity. When seeing b buys and s sales, the dealer knows that the
total number of traders, N, is at least b + s. Summing over all the possible realizations
of N,10
















ℓM(b,s)p + (1 − p)
,













10The details of the derivation for equation (3) as well as for equation (7) are in Appendix B.1.
9The informed trader’s trading decision rule. We will focus on the “buy” decision.
Consider trader i with private belief πi = π. He computes his expectation of the asset’s
value and the transaction price, conditional on his private information. The latter consists
of his presence in the market (N ≥ 1), his private signal and his action. He will buy if
E[V |π,N ≥ 1,i buys] ≥ E[p
￿ ￿π,N ≥ 1,i buys]. To simplify the exposition, in what follows
we will omit N ≥ 1 and i’s trading decision when writing the informed buyer’s expectation.
As outlined above, we are searching for an equilibrium such that nobody wishes to change
their action upon observing the order ﬂow. This implies, in particular, that the marginal
trader with the “buy-threshold” private belief π is just willing to buy for every realization
of buys and sales by others. Consequently, in equilibrium the threshold value π solves for
any b ≥ 1, s ≥ 0,11
(6) E[V |π,b,s] = p(b,s).
The Law of Iterated Expectations then implies that the marginal buyer’s expectation
coincides with this type’s expectation of the prices, E[V |¯ π] = E[p|¯ π]. Next, analogously
to the dealer’s pricing rule, the marginal trader’s expectation is given by
(7) E[V |π,b,s] =
ℓI(b,s;π)p
ℓI(b,s;π)p + (1 − p)
,
where ℓI(b,s;π) is the likelihood ratio of the high to low state, given the informed trader’s
private belief π, and supposing that he knew that there are b − 1 buy orders and s sell

























Using (4) and (7), indiﬀerence equation (6) can be rewritten as
(9)
ℓI(b,s;π)p
ℓI(b,s;π)p + (1 − p)
=
ℓM(b,s)p
ℓM(b,s)p + (1 − p)
for all (b,s).
11When the trader buys and there are a total of b buys and s sales, then b − 1 buys and s sales are
posted by the other traders.
12This expression is formally derived in Appendix B.2 in Step 1 of the existence proof. The main
diﬀerence between the dealer’s and the informed traders’ expectation is their assessment of the number
of traders in the economy: an informed trader knows that there is at least one trader (he) and thus he
employs a diﬀerent probability measure compared to the dealer.
10Rearranging, in equilibrium π solves
(10) ℓ
I(b,s;π) = ℓ
M(b,s) for all (b,s).
Hence, equilibrium decision rules are independent of the public belief about the asset’s
liquidation value. Moreover, this condition is identical for any trading history and thus
the trading threshold is independent of the trading history. The equilibrium condition
for the marginal selling type π is analogous, the diﬀerence being that the marginal seller
assumes there to be b buy orders and s − 1 sell orders by the other traders.
C Equilibrium Existence and Uniqueness
Noise buying and selling occur with the same probability. Suppose the prior p is neutral,
p = 1/2. Then favourable and unfavourable signals are equally likely in expectation, and
assuming an equilibrium exists, intuitively, there must be one with symmetric marginal
buying and selling thresholds, π = 1 − π. Since by (10) the equilibrium decisions rules
do not depend on the past trading activity, the symmetry of thresholds extends to any
trading history. In Appendix B we show that the symmetric equilibrium exists and that
it is the only one.
Symmetry of the thresholds implies that traders require the same signal quality to
buy and sell. As the signal quality distribution is independent of the true value, a buy
in the high state is as likely as a sale in the low state and vice versa (we show this
formally in Appendix A in Lemma 1). Thus a no-trade occurs with equal probability in
each state, γ0 = γ1. We can then simplify the likelihood ratios ℓM(b,s) and ℓI(b,s;π)
(equations (5) and (8)) because the eﬀects of no-trades cancel and rewrite the equilibrium








Since thresholds are symmetric, π = 1−π, we have π =
β0
β1+β0. We are now ready to state
the existence and uniqueness theorem.
Theorem (Symmetric Equilibrium: Existence and Uniqueness)
There exist unique (π,π) such that 0 < π < π < 1, any trader with private belief π ≥ π
buys, any trader with private belief π ≤ π sells, any trader with π ∈ (π,π) does not trade.
These thresholds are symmetric, π = 1 − π, and invariant with respect to time and past
order-ﬂows.
11The intuition for existence and uniqueness has a parallel in the relation of marginal and
average revenues. Suppose that the prior on the high liquidation value, V = 1, is 1/2.
Then the left hand side of the ﬁrst expression in (11) is the belief of the marginal buyer,
the right hand side is the price that a trader must pay if there is only one buy (and no
sales). This price accounts for the average information content of the buy, conditional on
the informed buyer holding a belief at or above π. Loosely speaking, in equilibrium, the
marginal belief π must coincide with the average belief derived from the observed buying
decision.
We will now argue more formally that there exists a unique point where average and
marginal coincide and that it is in (1/2,1). Suppose ﬁrst that the marginal buyer has a
belief 1/2. Since an informed buyer holds a belief at or above 1/2, buying reveals favorable
information about the asset. The price that a buyer pays when he is the only trader in
the market is then strictly above 1/2, i.e. the average is above the marginal. Now suppose
that the marginal buyer has a belief of 1. An informed buy arises with probability 0, and
the price for a single buyer is 1/2 so that the average is below the marginal. Continuity
yields existence. Analogously to many standard economic problems, average and marginal
coincide at an extremum of the average. Since the marginal is strictly increasing there
can be at most one such intersection. Hence uniqueness.
Finally, the marginal buyer’s and seller’s beliefs cannot coincide. Each trade has an
eﬀect on the price so that the marginal buyer’s belief, ¯ π, is strictly above 1/2. Threshold
symmetry then implies that ¯ π is strictly above the marginal seller’s belief, π = 1 − ¯ π.13
IV Price, Volume and Order Imbalance
The ﬁve major observable variables in our model are the price, the price-variability, the
volume, the net order ﬂow, and the order imbalance. The major primitives of the model
are the entry rate, the level of informed trading, and the distribution of information
qualities. In this section, we will discuss the relations among the observables for given
primitives. In the next section we will discuss how changes in the primitives aﬀect the
observables.
The relations among the observables have been widely analyzed empirically and the
predictions of our model are in line with the empirical observations. Some of these pre-
dictions are not readily generated by other theoretical models. Moreover, the results in
this section are a stepping stone for the novel implications that we derive later on.
Let bt and st denote the numbers of buys and sales respectively in period t. Then
13Thresholds π and π coincide only when there is no informed trading, µ = 0, which we rule out.
12volume is Volt := bt + st; the net order ﬂow is NOFt := bt − st; the order imbalance is the
absolute value of the net order ﬂow, IBt := |bt−st|. As before, pt is the price at time t and
|∆pt| is the absolute value of the price change from t−1 to t. We use |∆pt| as a measure
of price-variability.
We will ﬁrst analyze how the net order ﬂow aﬀects the price and how the current net
order ﬂow aﬀects the expectation of the future net order ﬂow. We then ask how order
imbalances and volume aﬀect price changes, how volume aﬀects the order imbalance, and
ﬁnally how the order imbalance today aﬀects the order imbalance tomorrow. We will not
study the relation of past and future prices explicitly. As is common in GM models, the
dealer’s expectation obeys the Law of Iterated Expectations so that the price process is
a martingale.
A Dynamics of Prices and Net Order Flows
Prices in our model incorporate all publicly available past information plus the new infor-
mation that is revealed by the current order ﬂow and are thus informationally eﬃcient.
With competitive pricing, equation (2) holds and thus the past price is a suﬃcient statis-
tic for the asset’s true value: pt−1(bt−1,st−1) = E[V |bt−1,st−1,Ht−1] = E[V |Ht] = Pr(V =
1|Ht) = pt. Threshold symmetry and time invariance imply the following law of motion
for transaction prices:
Proposition 1 (Price Dynamics)
In equilibrium, transaction price pt is determined by the number of buy- and sell-orders bt


















stPr(V = 1|Ht) + e−ν(1−γ0)β0
btσ0
st(1 − Pr(V = 1|Ht))
.
The time-t public prior, Pr(V = 1|Ht) = pt, coincides with the time-(t − 1) transaction
price pt−1. Threshold symmetry π = 1 − π implies β1 = σ0, β0 = σ1, γ1 = γ0. ￿
Corollary (Prices and Net Order Flows) For any history, the time-t transaction
price pt strictly increases in the time-t net order ﬂow NOFt = bt − st.
13The corollary is empirically supported by, among others, Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1994),
Brown, Walsh, and Yuen (1997) or Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002).
Proposition 1 states that the dynamics of prices are linked to the net order ﬂow.14
It is thus important to understand the behavior of the latter. Threshold symmetry and
time-invariance yield the following result:
Proposition 2 (“Buys beget Buys”)
The expectation of the future net order ﬂow increases in the current price as follows: the
expected time-t net order ﬂow given history Ht is given by
E[NOFt|Ht] = (2pt−1 − 1)ν(β1 − β0).
Proposition 2 implies, in particular, that the expectation of the future net order ﬂow
increases in the current price. To see why this is true, observe that in the high state,
V = 1, favourable signals are more likely than unfavourable ones. Consequently, when
the high state is more likely than the low state, pt > 1/2, one assigns higher probability
to situations with bt − st > 0 than to bt − st < 0. Since the current price increases in the
current net order ﬂow (Proposition 1), a larger past net order ﬂow creates the expectation
of a larger future net order ﬂow. Our model thus predicts that buys are more likely to
follow buys than sales and vice versa. Empirically this was observed, for instance, by
Hasbrouck and Ho (1987) or by Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002).
Proposition 2 further implies that the dealer may accumulate an inventory. This
inventory build-up is facilitated by the dealer’s risk neutrality. If she were to account
for her inventory risk, then she would likely take pro-active steps to reduce her exposure.
This would, at least in part, counter the eﬀect that we identify here.
The prediction of the corollary has also been generated in other dealer market models,
for instance in Kyle (1985) and Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988). Our approach complements
the ﬁndings from these frameworks by admitting a non-zero expected order ﬂow,15 and
it thus allows us to predict how the past order ﬂow aﬀects the expectation of the future
order ﬂow (Proposition 2).
14In a degenerate version of our model, in which at most one trader can enter at a time, the corollary
is equivalent to Proposition 1 of Glosten and Milgrom (1985). The time-t transaction price pt becomes
the time-t ask price for (bt,st) = (1,0) and the time-t bid price for (bt,st) = (0,1). The corollary implies
that the ask price is greater and the bid price is smaller than the public expectation, which equals the
preceding period’s transaction price pt−1.
15See, for instance, equation (3.11) or (4.2) in Kyle (1985); the expectation of the net order ﬂows
expressed there is zero by the Law of Iterated Expectations; similarly in Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988).
14B Volume and the Order Imbalance.
While a larger net order ﬂow increases the expectation of the future net order ﬂow, the
same need not hold for their absolute values, i.e. the order imbalances. Indeed, the ﬁrst
part of the following result shows that in expectation the order imbalance is independent
of past trading activity. Next, as signals are informative, an increase in the number of
traders yields proportionally more trades in the “right” rather than the “wrong” direction.
Hence larger volume should on average lead to larger order imbalances. The second part
of the following result conﬁrms this intuition.
Proposition 3 (Order Imbalance and Volume)
(a) The expected absolute value of the time-t net order ﬂow E[IBt
￿ ￿Ht] is inde-
pendent of the transaction history: E[IBt
￿ ￿Ht] = E[IBt′
￿ ￿Ht′] ∀t,t′.
(b) Conditional on the realized time-t volume, the expected absolute value
of the time-t net order ﬂow E[IBt
￿ ￿Volt,Ht] increases in Volt.
Studies that focus on order imbalances (e.g. Chan and Fong (2000)) implicitly yield (b),
and we are not aware of empirical studies that test (a).
The positive relation between volume and order imbalances that we identify here
provides insights for the strong empirical performance of the so called Amihud measure.
Developed in Amihud (2002), it measures (il-)liquidity by the ratio of the absolute value
of the daily dollar return of a stock to its dollar trading volume. At ﬁrst sight volume
seems to be too coarse a measure because, say, 2 million shares bought by or sold to a
dealer aﬀect liquidity diﬀerently than buy and sell orders of 1 million shares each arriving
simultaneously. Proposition 3 predicts, however, that the Amihud measure is correlated
with measures that employ the order imbalance — as has been observed empirically.
C Price Variability.
We will now investigate how volume and the order imbalance aﬀect the absolute values
of price changes, or price variability, |∆pt| := |pt − pt−1|. Proposition 1 implies that the
transaction price increases in the net order ﬂow. Yet, it is not immediate that a larger
order imbalance leads to a larger price change because the price is not linear in the net
order ﬂow. Suppose that pt−1 > 1/2 so that the time-t prior favours the high liquidation
value. Then, for a given order imbalance IBt = |bt −st|, a negative net order ﬂow, bt < st,
lowers the price by more than a positive net order ﬂow, bt > st, would increase it by. In
other words, a net order ﬂow that reconﬁrms the prevailing public opinion leads to smaller
price changes than one that is at odds with it. However, for the expected eﬀect we show
15Proposition 4 (Price Variability and the Order Imbalance)
The expected absolute value of the price change at time t conditional on the order imbal-
ance, E[|∆pt|
￿ ￿IBt,Ht], increases in the order imbalance IBt.
The results of Propositions 3 and 4 show that a larger volume leads to larger order imbal-
ances and that larger order imbalances lead to higher price variability. As a consequence,
intuitively, there should be a positive relation between volume and the magnitude of price
changes. The following proposition conﬁrms this intuition and shows that in expectation
higher volume leads to larger price changes.
Proposition 5 (Price Variability and Volume)
The expectation of the absolute price change conditional on the realized time-t volume
E[|∆pt|
￿ ￿Volt,Ht] increases in volume Volt.
Proposition 5 has been empirically documented in several studies, see, for instance,
Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen (1992) or Karpoﬀ (1987) for earlier references. Chordia, Roll,
and Subrahmanyam (2002) and Chan and Fong (2000) additionally highlight the eﬀect of
the order imbalance on price variability, providing evidence for both Propositions 4 and
5.
The positive relation between price volatility and volume has also been obtained the-
oretically in other settings. For instance, Wang (1994) shows this relation in a CARA-
Gaussian rational expectations setup. Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988) generate a result
similar to our Proposition 5 in a setting where the number of traders is endogenously
determined by the extent of discretionary noise trading. Speciﬁcally, they show that price
variability is larger in periods with concentrated trading.
Although rational expectation models with a CARA-Gaussian structure yield valuable
insights into the volume-volatility relation, results on order imbalances such as Proposition
4 can only obtain in markets that do not perforce clear, such as intermediated markets.
The relation of volume and the order imbalance and that of price-variability and the order
imbalance have not been explicitly analyzed in either Kyle (1985) or Admati and Pﬂeiderer
(1988). Further, models in this tradition have an underlying normal structure and for a
tractable volume analysis it is important that the expected net order ﬂow is zero.16 To
understand and compute the dynamics of prices, volume, and order imbalances (as studied
in Propositions 3 and 4) it may, however, be desirable to have no such restriction. As
our framework explicitly admits non-zero expected net order ﬂows (see Proposition 2),
our ﬁndings in Propositions 3 and 4 are arguably based on a less restrictive premise.
16If the equilibrium has this property, then one can employ half-normal distributions to compute the
expected volume.
16Moreover, higher volume in our model is closely linked to a larger transaction rate, a
topic that we discuss below in more detail.
D Duration
The time span between transactions, also called the “duration” (see Engle and Russell
(1998) for a formal deﬁnition), has recently gained attention in the literature. Lesmond,
Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) use duration to estimate transaction costs. Foucault, Kadan,
and Kandel (2005) develop a theoretical model in which liquidity traders account for
duration in their choice of submitting market or limit orders.
The simplest cause for a long duration is a low arrival rate of traders. Yet, this view
does not consider that the arrival rate of trades is endogenous to the market environment.
For instance, high transaction costs may deter people from trading, thus lowering the
transaction rate.17
In our model the transaction rate is determined by the exogenous Poisson arrival
rate ν, the probability that a trader is informed  , and the trading thresholds π and π.
Under a Poisson process arrival rate, a zero-arrival occurs with positive probability. More
importantly, if none of the arriving informed traders hold beliefs that are extreme enough,
that is, if πi ∈ (π,π) for all informed traders, then there will also be no trading. The
probability of no trading in state V =v follows from equation (B-1) in Appendix B.1.18
Pr(no trade|V = v)
= Pr(no arrival|V = v) +
∞ P
j=1
Pr(j arrivals|V = v)Pr(∀j : πj ∈ (π,π)|V = v) = e−ν(1−γv).
Since γ1 = γ0, we have Pr(no trade) = pte−ν(1−γ1) + (1 − pt)e−ν(1−γ0) = e−ν(1−γ1), where
γv =  (Fv(π)−Fv(π)). Consequently, the arrival of no-trades is determined solely by the
exogenous parameters of the model and the equilibrium behavior, and it does not change
with the trading history.
Next, occurrences of the events “trade” and “no-trade” are a Bernoulli process. As
17When duration is long, limit orders become implicitly more expensive because it will take longer for
them to be ﬁlled. In this sense, duration adds to the transaction costs. Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka
(1999) discuss this direct impact of duration on transaction costs. In Foucault, Kadan, and Kandel (2005)
duration feeds back into transaction costs, the idea being that for longer duration, traders are more
inclined to submit market orders (which, by deﬁnition, get executed faster than limit orders). Studying
the impact of this general relation in a theoretical trading model, they show that longer duration decreases
the bid-ask-spread because traders submit more aggressive limit orders. While we do not study the choice
between market and limit orders, our framework adds to the discussion by oﬀering an informational angle
on endogenous arrival rates.
18Equation (B-1) deﬁnes the probability that the market marker attaches to b buys and s sales; here
we study the special case with b = s = 0.
17trading in our model occurs at discrete points in time, the time between two periods with
transactions is determined by this Bernoulli process. A simple measure for duration in our
model is the expected number of future consecutive no-trading periods. The probability
of trading is the same for all periods and we can compute










(1 − e−ν(1−γ1))2. (13)
This measure depends solely on γ1 and the parameter ν, it is increasing in γ1 and de-
creasing in ν. The above discussion implies
Proposition 6 (Duration) Duration D(ν,γ1) is independent of the trading history.
In models where the underlying noise and information are normally distributed, the
number of informed traders must be known (noise trader orders are only considered as
an aggregate ﬁgure). Moreover, every informed trader in these models trades. Taken
together, this eﬀectively ﬁxes the number of transactions, as was pointed out by, for
instance, Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1994). Thus these models are not designed to analyze
transaction rates and, relatedly, duration. In our setup, on the other hand, the number
of traders is uncertain and the transaction rate is endogenous.
Episodes of no or low trading activity also arise in Easley and O’Hara (1992). These
episodes are most likely to obtain when no private information is available and transactions
stem exclusively from noise traders. Low trading activity then indicates that trading
occurs for non-informational reasons, and it implies low adverse selection costs. We
complement Easley and O’Hara (1992) and provide an interpretation of low transaction
rates in presence of private information. In our setting, informed traders are always
present but they may choose not to trade if their private information is not suﬃciently
precise. Lower trading activity then corresponds to more accurately informed active
traders, and longer duration is associated with higher adverse selection costs and higher
transaction costs.
V Changes in Arrival Rates and Information Quality
A Comparative Statics on Arrival Rates
The expected number of traders in our model is governed by the Poisson parameter ν.
Intuitively, an increase in ν leads to a higher expected volume, and as a consequence, to a
higher absolute value of the order imbalance, larger price changes, and shorter duration.
18Proposition 7 (Comparative Statics on the Entry Rate)
As the exogenous entry rate ν increases, so do expected trading volume, E[Volt|Ht], the
expected value of the order imbalance, E[IBt|Ht], and the expected magnitude of the price
change, E[|∆pt|
￿
￿Ht]. Duration D(ν,γ1) decreases.
An increase in the arrival rate ν signiﬁes a persistent switch in investor composition, for
instance, triggered by a company’s inclusion into a major index (so that index-tracking
funds must hold the stock) or the advent of internet-based trading. Our model thus
predicts, in particular, that any such event should lead to higher price variability, larger
volume and lower duration.
In our framework, an increase in ν proportionally increases the (expected) number of
both, informed and uninformed traders. Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988) perform a related
comparative static by increasing the (known) number of informed traders. They ﬁnd, in
their setting with no timing, that such an increase leads to higher trading volume but
does not aﬀect the price variability.
B Comparative Statics on Quality Distributions
We will now study how persistent changes in the information quality aﬀect the marginal
trading types and through them price informativeness, volatility and volume.
In contrast to setups with normally distributed information, traders in our model need
not know the quality of others’ information but require only knowledge of the overall
distribution of information in the economy. We are thus able to analyze the impact of
economy-wide shifts in information processing. Further, traders in our model may abstain
from trading, and we can thus study changes in transaction rates. The importance of the
transaction rate is highlighted, for instance, by Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1994), who
show that the positive volume-volatility relation is driven by the number of transactions.
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008) argue that turnover has increased over the last
decade because of an increase in the frequency of (small) transactions.
Parametrization of Information Quality. Systematic shifts in a quality distri-
bution occur when there is a persistent change in the fraction of traders who are better
informed or more capable at processing information. A positive shift can be triggered,
for instance, by more extensive analyst coverage for a stock, as this would improve the
average trader’s information. A stock may also attract a more informed clientele when it
gets included in a major index, as major funds will then add it to their portfolios. With
such an inclusion, the company often faces additional disclosure requirements, further af-
fecting the distribution of traders’ signal qualities. Many of these changes are observable
19and the predicted impacts can be tested empirically. Additionally, the quality of analysts’
earning forecasts can serve as a proxy for the average information quality.
In what follows, we will formally model improvements in information quality by shifts
in the underlying distribution in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance (FOSD).
To study these shifts we will employ a family of signal quality distributions that is pa-
rameterized by a scalar θ ∈ Θ, and we will assume that the signal distributions are twice
diﬀerentiable with respect to θ; details are in Appendix A.2. Thus when we speak of
a shift in information quality or an improvement in information quality we mean that
the “new” quality distribution ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates the “old” one so that
under the new distribution, traders have systematically higher quality information.
Marginal Trading Types, Trade Informativeness and Market Depth. To
describe eﬀects of signal quality distributions on empirically observable variables, we must
ﬁrst establish how they aﬀect traders’ behavior. The major variable of interest is thus the
belief of the marginal buyer and seller.
The informativeness of a transaction is synonymous with its marginal impact on the
price. The usual interpretation of the price impact of a trade is that it is inversely
related to market depth.19 As can be seen from the price dynamics equation (12), the
price impact is inversely related to the ratio of “wrong” to “correct” trading decision
probabilities: β0/β1 = σ1/σ0. Consequently, the smaller this ratio is, the stronger is the
price impact of the marginal order.
Proposition 8 (Trade Informativeness and Price Impact)
As information quality improves,
(a) The buy-threshold private belief π(θ) increases and the sell-threshold π(θ) decreases.
(b) Market depth, measured by β0(π(θ))/β1(π(θ)), decreases and each trade has a
larger price impact.
Suppose that a regulatory shift causes traders to be on average better informed and that,
for the sake of the argument, the buying and selling thresholds remained unchanged.
Then each trade would become more informative and traders would be able to learn
more from the price. One might imagine that, as a consequence, the marginal buyers
and sellers would require less precise private information. This would cause the selling
threshold to increase and the buying threshold to decrease. This argument, however,
neglects the dealer’s perspective who faces the adverse selection problem and who has to
protect herself against well-informed traders. As after the shift traders are systematically
19For instance, in models in the tradition of Kyle (1985), the price is a linear function of the net order
ﬂow. Market depth is then measured by the inverse of the slope coeﬃcient of the order ﬂow.
20better informed, the dealer is more likely to encounter well-informed traders. Thus for a
given order ﬂow, she must set prices that are more extreme (she raises prices for positive
net order ﬂows and lowers them for negative ones). In equilibrium, the adverse selection
eﬀect dominates, and, as a result, traders require more precise information to trade.
Trading Volume, Order Imbalance and Price Variability. As information qual-
ity improves, there are two opposing eﬀects. First, there are more traders with high-quality
information. For the same threshold, this would increase volume. Second, trading thresh-
olds become more extreme because the dealer has to account for the increased adverse
selection problem. The latter eﬀect increases the price impact, and it is thus, eﬀectively,
an increase in transaction costs. Ceteris paribus, increased transaction costs would lead
to lower volume. In what follows we will provide a suﬃcient (technical) condition so that
the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates and volume increases.
Volume in our model coincides with the number of transactions. Its expectation
is proportional to the probability that a trader who arrives at the market chooses to
buy or sell. The expected number of arriving traders is the Poisson parameter ν and
traders’ decisions are independent conditional on the asset value. The expected number of
transactions given this Poisson process can then be obtained by multiplying the exogenous
arrival rate with the probability that an arriving trader initiates a transaction in each state
(a formal derivation is part of the proof of Proposition 7)
E[Volt] = ptν(β1 + σ1) + (1 − pt)ν(β0 + σ0) = ν(β1 + σ1).
The last equality follows from the symmetry of buy- and sell-threshold private beliefs.
For an analytical result, we restrict attention to a class of distributions for which shifts







and denoting partial derivatives by subscripts, we require the distributions to satisfy
(⋆) 2Ψπ,θΨ + (2π − 1)(Ψπ,πΨθ − Ψπ,θΨπ) < 0.
This condition is, for instance, satisﬁed for the class of quadratic quality distributions
that is outlined at the end of Appendix A or for the symmetric Beta distribution.
Proposition 9 (Signal Quality Shifts and Observable Variables)
Assume condition (⋆) holds. Then as information quality increases, the expected volume,
E[Vol|θ], the expected order imbalance, E[IB|θ], and the expected price variability, E[|∆pt||θ]
all increase. Duration D(ν,γ1;θ) decreases.
21Intuitively, as the threshold quality increases, so does the expected order imbalance — a
higher marginal trading quality implies that a smaller fraction of traders take the “wrong”
action. Combined with increasing volume, higher imbalances become more likely (as
implied by Proposition 3). A similar mechanism applies to price changes and thus price
variability. Duration decreases in the transaction probability, 1−γ1 = β1+σ1 (expression
(13)). The latter is proportional to volume and increases with signal quality.
This proposition is empirically supported by Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008)
who argue that “the increase in turnover is associated with greater production of private
information”.
Our results in Propositions 8 and 9 relate to the theoretical predictions on informa-
tion quality that have been obtained by varying traders’ signal precisions. For instance,
Wang (1994) shows in a rational expectations framework that as the precision of informa-
tion improves, volume increases and the correlation between volume and price variability
decreases. In Admati and Pﬂeiderer (1988), an increase in signal precision is oﬀset by
trading activity so that there is no eﬀect on price variability. The price impact (measured
by the Kyle-λ) of better quality information is ambiguous.20
We contribute to the existing theoretical literature by analyzing how the distributions
of economy-wide information and information processing skills aﬀect major observable
trading variables. A redistribution of information represents, for instance, a persistent
shift in the investorship, which can occur when a stock gets included in a major index.
Such an inclusion will typically increase major funds’ holdings of the stock and may
lead to a relatively higher fraction of well-informed traders. In our framework, a shift in
information quality is accompanied by changes in trader participation rates. This feature
allows us to derive novel predictions on the impact of signal quality on duration.
C Comparative Statics on Noise Trading
When the fraction of informed traders,  , increases, then, ceteris paribus, each trade is
more likely to be initiated by an informed trader and the adverse selection costs for the
dealer increase. She will thus revise prices and informed traders will require a higher
quality signal to trade. We then show
Proposition 10 (Comparative Statics for Noise Trading)
As the level of informed trading   increases
(a) the buy-threshold private belief π( ) increases and the sell-threshold π( ) decreases,
(b) expected trading volume E[Vol| ] decreases, and
(c) duration D(ν,γ1; ) increases.
20See equation (18) in their paper.
22To see why volume declines in the proportion of informed traders, consider the following
thought experiment in which a noise trader is substituted with an informed trader. As a
noise trader, he would have traded with certainty, whereas as an informed trader, he needs
information of suﬃcient quality to be trading. Moreover, compared to the situation with
a lot of noise, he needs better quality information which further reduces the probability
of a transaction. These two eﬀects decrease volume and increase duration.
As volume declines, Proposition 3 implies that, ceteris paribus, the expected order
imbalance declines. At the same time, each trade is more informative and thus has a
higher eﬀect on the price. As the two eﬀects are opposing, the direction of change in price
variability is unclear. Numerical simulations reveal that the ﬁrst eﬀect dominates:21
Numerical Observation (Noise and Volatility) Price variability increases in  .
Foster and Viswanathan (1993) show empirically that volume and adverse selection are
(weakly) positively correlated, providing support for the thesis that quality improvement
shifts (which, by Proposition 9, increase adverse selection) lead to higher volume.
Summary. The above discussion implies that trading volume and volatility are negatively
related for changes in  . So while signal quality shifts and increases in informed trading
both increase adverse selection costs, they generate opposing implications for the volume-
volatility relation. Empirically there is a positive relation between volume and volatility.
Thus the implications of shifts in noise trading are at odds with empirical ﬁndings, while
the implications for information-quality shifts are in line with the data.
VI Conclusion
Combining features of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985) in a simple model of a
dealer market, we study the dynamic relations among volume, order imbalances and price
variability. In ﬁnancial markets, the number of active traders and the precision of their
information are unknown. Incorporating these features into the frameworks that employ
normal distributions would render the analysis intractable — in contrast, our setup allows
us to study unknown precisions and an unknown number of traders.
We ﬁrst derive the trading equilibrium and study its properties, in particular, with
respect to the dynamic relationships among the major trading variables. We establish
that higher volume leads to higher price volatility and higher order imbalances. We then
study changes in the information structure to understand the eﬀects of the distribution
21Details for the simulations are available upon request from the authors. The distribution class that
we employed for the numerical analysis is outlined at the end of Appendix A.
23of information. We show that ﬁrst order stochastic dominance improvements of signal
quality lead to higher volume, order imbalances and price variability.
The results from signal quality shifts are consistent with empirical evidence and have
appealing economic interpretations. Information quality improves when, for instance, an-
alyst coverage increases, when hedge funds newly invest in a company, when the company
adopts a more transparent information release policy, or when regulators require compa-
nies to disclose more information. Our results indicate that these measures will lead not
only to more eﬃcient prices (because active traders have better information) but also to
higher trading volume. Our ﬁnal comparative static studies changes in the entry rate: as
the entry rate increases, so do price variability and volume. Empirically, entry rates are
aﬀected, for instance, when a stock is in- or excluded from an index.
In summary, our paper identiﬁes several new channels that aﬀect the volume-volatility
relation and thus contributes to our understanding of common empirical ﬁndings.
Table 1 summarizes our theoretical ﬁndings and empirical predictions. It also either
lists existing evidence for the respective result or suggests testing procedures for empirical
veriﬁcation or falsiﬁcation.
A Appendix: Quality and Belief Distributions
In the main text, we describe trading behavior in terms of the trader’s belief π that the
asset’s value is high. This description is mathematically convenient because we can focus
on a scalar variable and not the vector consisting of the signal (h or l) and the signal
quality. We now describe how the belief distributions are obtained from the signal quality
distributions, and we describe properties of the belief distributions. In the second part of
the appendix we discuss the parametrization of signal qualities used in Section V.
A.1 Derivation and Properties of the Belief Distribution
Financial market microstructure models with binary signals and states typically employ
a constant, commonly known signal quality q ∈ [1/2,1], with Pr(S = v|V = v) = q. Our
framework has a continuum of possible qualities with a continuous density function and we
will map traders’ signals and their qualities into a continuous private belief on [0,1]. The
quality parametrization on [1/2,1] is natural, as a trader who receives a high signal h will
update his prior in favor of the high liquidation value, V = 1, and a trader who receives
a low signal l will update his prior in favor of V = 0. We thus use the conventional
parametrization on [1/2,1] in the main text.
24However, to characterize the map from traders’ signal and qualities into their private
beliefs and to derive the distributions of the latter, it is mathematically convenient to
normalize the signal quality so that its domain coincides with that of a private belief.
We will denote the distribution function of this normalized quality on [0,1] by G and
its density by g, whereas the distribution and density functions of original qualities on
[1/2,1] will be denoted by ˜ G and ˜ g respectively.
The normalization proceeds as follows. Without loss of generality, we will employ
the density function g that is symmetric around 1/2. For q ∈ [0,1/2], we then have
g(q) = ˜ g(1 − q)/2 and for q ∈ [1/2,1], we have g(q) = ˜ g(q)/2.
Under this speciﬁcation, signal qualities q and 1−q are equally useful for the individ-
ual: if someone receives signal h and has quality 1/4, then this signal has “the opposite
meaning”, i.e. it has the same meaning as receiving signal l with quality 3/4. Signal
qualities are assumed to be independent across agents, and independent of the security’s
liquidation value V .
Beliefs are derived by Bayes Rule, given signals and signal-qualities. Speciﬁcally, if
a trader is told that his signal quality is q and receives a high signal h then his belief
is q/[q + (1 − q)] = q (respectively, 1 − q if he receives a low signal l), because the prior
is 1/2. The belief π is thus held by people who receive signal h and quality q = π and by
those who receive signal l and quality q = 1−π. Consequently, the density of individuals
with belief π is given by f1(π) = π[g(π) + g(1 − π)] in state V = 1 and analogously by
f0(π) = (1 − π)[g(π) + g(1 − π)] in state V = 0. Smith and Sorensen (2008) prove the
following property of private beliefs (their Lemma 2):
Lemma 1 (Symmetric beliefs, Smith and Sorensen (2008))
With the above the signal quality structure, private belief distributions satisfy F1(π) =
1 − F0(1 − π) for all π ∈ (0,1).
Proof: Since f1(π) = π[g(π) + g(1 − π)] and f0(π) = (1 − π)[g(π) + g(1 − π)], we have




0 f0(1 − x)dx =
R 1
1−π f0(x)dx =
1 − F0(1 − π). ￿
A direct implication of this lemma is that with symmetric thresholds, π = 1 − π, a
buy in state V = 1 is as likely as a sale in state V = 0, because
β1 = (1 −  )/2 +  (1 − F1(π)) = (1 −  )/2 +  F0(1 − π) = (1 −  )/2 +  F0(π) = σ0.




π[g(π) + g(1 − π)]




25is increasing in π.
One can recover the distribution of qualities on [1/2,1], denoted by ˜ G, from G by
combining qualities that yield the same beliefs for opposing signals (e.g q = 1/4 and
signal h is combined with q = 3/4 and signal l). With symmetric g, G(1/2) = 1/2, and












g(s)ds = 2G(q) − 2G(1/2) = 2G(q) − 1.
A.2 Stochastic Dominance of Belief Distributions.
Section V.B focusses on families of signal quality distributions that are described by a
parameter θ ∈ Θ ⊆ R and that obey ﬁrst order stochastic dominance with respect to θ.
First order stochastic dominance refers to the distribution of qualities ˜ G on [1/2,1]. We
will now argue that when ˜ G( |θh) ﬁrst order stochastically dominates ˜ G( |θl), then G( |θl)
second order stochastically dominates G( |θh).
Loosely speaking, a ﬁrst order stochastic dominance shift in ˜ G increases the number
of high (close to 1) quality signals and decreases the number of low (close to 1/2) quality
signals. Symmetry of the quality density function g on [0,1] then implies that under
G( |θh) there are relatively more signals with qualities close to 0 and 1 and relatively
fewer signals with qualities around 1/2. Since g is symmetric around 1/2, the mean
quality on [0,1] is constant and equals 1/2. The above discussion implies, intuitively, that
G( |θh) is a mean preserving spread of G( |θl).
Formally, suppose that ˜ G(q|θh) FOSD ˜ G(q|θl) for q ≥ 1/2, i.e. for q ∈ [1/2,1],







G(s|θl)ds ≥ 0 ∀x ≤ 1.
In other words, if ˜ G FOSD ˜ G′, then G′ SOSD G.
An example for a parametric class of distributions on [0,1] that obeys second order
stochastic dominance is the following class of quadratic quality distributions with density









+ 1, q ∈ [0,1] and θ ∈ [−6,12].
This class includes the uniform density (for θ = 0); the distribution of qualities G and ˜ G
26on [1/2,1] can be obtained by integration as outlined in (A-1):
˜ G(q|θ) = 4q + 4θq(q − 1)(q − 1/2)/3 − 1, ˜ Gθ(q|θ) = 2q(q − 1)(q − 1/2)/3 < 0 for q > 1/2.
This class of distributions was used to establish the Numerical Observation in Section V.
B Appendix: Omitted Proofs
B.1 Expectations of Dealer and Informed Traders.
Derivation of Equation (3) in the Dealer’s Pricing Rule. Suppose that the dealer
observes b buy orders and s sell orders and that people follow thresholds rules so that
each trader with belief π ≥ π buys and each trader with belief π ≤ π sells. The time-t
price satisﬁes p(b,s) = E[V |b,s,Ht], which, by equation (2), depends on Pr(b,s|Ht,V ).
No trades are intrinsically unobservable. When seeing b buys and s sales, the dealer
knows that the total number of traders, N, is at least b+s — but N may be larger because
informed traders with π ∈ (π,π) choose not to trade. We ﬁrst determine Pr(b,s|Ht,V,N)
and then sum over all the possible outcomes N = b + s + h, where h = 0,...,∞ denotes
the number of no trades and N is the number of potential traders. Next, N traders
arrive with Poisson probability νNe−ν/N!. Conditional on the asset’s true value, and
these N people select into buyers, sellers, and those people who do not trade according
to a multinomial distribution. For ﬁxed b and s we have
Pr(b,s|V = v) =
∞ X
N=b+s

















Informed Trader’s Expectation. Consider a trader who intends to buy and suppose
that the informed trader observes b − 1 buy orders and s sell orders by others. Then
E[V |π,b,s,Ht] =
πPr(b,s|π,Ht,V = 1)pt
πPr(b,s|π,Ht,V = 1)pt + (1 − π)Pr(b,s|π,Ht,V = 0)(1 − pt)
.
As for the dealer, no trades are unobservable. We thus derive the informed trader’s
expectation for a known number of traders, and then sum over all the possible outcomes
b + s + h ≥ 1, h = 0,...,∞; accounting for the fact that the informed trader knows that
27there is at least 1 trader. Omitting Ht, for a trader who buys
Pr(b,s|π,V = v) =
∞ X
Vol=b+s









(h + b + s)!
γv












(h + b + s)h!
.
B.2 Proof of the Existence and Uniqueness Theorem
The existence theorem states that an equilibrium exists, that the thresholds in this equi-
librium are symmetric, π = 1−π, and that it is unique. We ﬁrst show that in equilibrium
the thresholds must be history invariant and symmetric. We then show existence and
uniqueness of the indiﬀerence thresholds. In the ﬁnal step, we verify that the posited
equilibrium behavior is incentive compatible, i.e. that for traders with beliefs higher than
the buying thresholds it is optimal to buy, that for traders with beliefs below the selling
threshold it is best to sell, and that all others optimally abstain.
Step 1: History Invariance and Threshold Symmetry. Assume an equilibrium
exists at each time t. Then the indiﬀerence thresholds are independent of the trading
history and symmetric, π = 1 − π at all dates t.
Proof: History invariance follows from equation (10).
Inserting the probabilities that we derived at the beginning of this appendix into the







































Since b + s ≥ 1, each sum in the above expressions converges and the ratios are well-
deﬁned. Suppose that π  = 1 − π. This implies, in particular, that γ0  = γ1. Since π must





































1 + eγγ − eγ
γ2 ,
28π  = 1 − π that solves (B-2) exists only if there exist γ0  = γ1 on (0,1) such that
ϕ(γ1) ≡
γ1(eγ1 − 1)
1 + eγ1γ1 − eγ1 =
γ0(eγ0 − 1)
1 + eγ0γ0 − eγ0 ≡ ϕ(γ0).
Function ϕ(γ) decreases on (0,1), thus such γ0  = γ1 do not exist.
Step 2: Existence and Uniqueness. In an equilibrium, any trade is informative,
that is indiﬀerence thresholds are in (0,1). The argument proceeds by contradiction.
Suppose, for instance, that π = 0 and π = 1, that is, no informed trader buys or sells.
All trades are then uninformative, and the dealer would set the price to 1/2. This implies
that the best response of any informed trader with a private belief below 1/2 is to post a
sell-order, and the best response of any informed trader with belief above 1/2 is to post
a buy-order, a contradiction. Cases π = π = 0 and π = π = 1 are analogous.
Since thresholds are symmetric in equilibrium, we can focus on π. Trade informative-
ness together with equation (11) on π imply that π must be at least 1/2. What remains
to show is existence and uniqueness of π ∈ [1/2,1).









G(s) ds = 0,
where G(q) is the cumulative distribution function of the quality distribution.
In the main text we have shown that if thresholds are symmetric, i.e. if π = 1 − π, then
γ1 = γ0 and π solves π = β1/(β1 +β0). Integrating density f1(π), derived in Appendix A,
and using the symmetry of g around 1/2, we have
F1(π) = 2πG(π) − 2
Z π
0
G(s) ds ⇒ β1 = (1 −  )/2 +  
￿






Expressing F0(π) analogously, F1(π) + F0(π) = 2G(π) so that β1 + β0 = 1 +   − 2 G(π).
Then π = β1/(β1 + β0) can be rewritten as (B-3).
Step 2(ii): We establish that (B-3) has a unique solution π ∈ (1/2,1).
The left hand side of (B-3) is continuous and strictly increasing in π: its slope is
(1 +  )/2  − G(π) > 1 − G(π) > 0 for all   ∈ (0,1). At π = 1/2, the left hand side
of (B-3) is −
R 1/2
0 G(s)ds < 0. At π = 1, it is (  + 1)/4  − 1/2 > 0 for all   ∈ (0,1).22
Consequently, there exists a unique root π ∈ (1/2,1).
Step 3: Monotonic decision rules in equilibrium. We will now argue that
the equilibrium behavior depicted above is indeed incentive compatible. Namely, if an
22Symmetry of g around 1/2 yields
R 1




0 sg(s)ds = 1 − 1/2 = 1/2.
29informed trader’s has a private belief above the buying threshold, then buying is the
optimal action; similarly for selling. Thus for the equilibrium thresholds π > π any
trader with a private belief π ≥ π prefers to post a buy order, any trader with a private
belief π ≤ π prefers to post a sell order, and any trader with a private belief in (π,π)
chooses to refrain from trading. Speciﬁcally, we show the following.
Let π,π be the indiﬀerence thresholds that satisfy the conditions in (11). Any trader
with belief π > π makes a positive proﬁt from buying, any trader with belief π < π makes
a loss from buying; any trader with belief π < π makes a positive proﬁt from selling, any
trader with belief π > π makes a loss from buying.
Proof: Take πi > π. We shown before (for πi ≡ π) that
E[V |b,s,πi] =
ℓI(b,s;πi)p






















Since ℓI(b,s;πi) increases in πi and since E[V |b,s,πi] increases in ℓI(b,s;πi) we have
that the expectation E[V |b,s,πi] increases in πi. Since the equilibrium threshold sat-
isﬁes E[V |b,s,π] = p(b,s) for all b,s, it follows that E[V |b,s,πi] > p(b,s) for all b,s. Thus
E[E[V |b,s,πi]−p(b,s)
￿
￿πi] > 0 for all πi > π. Since π is common knowledge in equilibrium,
any trader with belief πi > π strictly prefers to buy; analogously any trader with πi < π
has E[V |b,s,πi] < p(b,s) for any (b,s). Likewise for the selling case.
B.3 Proof of Proposition 2
As the expectations for bt and st both exist, we write E[NOFt|Ht] = E[bt − st|Ht] =






















= νβ1pt−1 + νβ0(1 − pt−1).
Likewise, E[st|Ht] = νσ1pt−1 + νσ0(1 − pt−1). With symmetric thresholds, σ1 = β0 and
σ0 = β1, which yield the result.
30B.4 Proof of Proposition 3
We ﬁrst compute the expected absolute value of the order imbalance IBt = |bt − st|
conditional on the realized number of transactions b + s = Vol. We write more com-




|2b − Vol|Pr(bt = b,st = Vol − b|Ht).
Traders’ decisions are independent, conditional on the asset’s true liquidation value, and












































Proof of (a): The probability of there being Vol trades at time t is given by

























With symmetric thresholds the unconditional probability is given by





It is independent of the trading history, hence, using (B-5) and (B-6), so is E[IBt|Ht].
Proof of (b): We need to show that E[|b − s||N = 2k + 1] − E[|b − s||N = 2k] > 0. For





























































Recognizing that the second sum in the above expression can be rewritten as a sum from 0
to k, and rearranging further, we obtain

























Since 1/2 < ρ < 1, this last expression is positive.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 4
We divide the expectation into the sum of two terms, according to the sign of the order
imbalance. To simplify notation, we will assume ν = 1, the proof does not rely on this
assumption. We will ﬁrst compute
E
+[|∆pt||IBt] ≡ E[|∆pt|||bt − st| = IBt,bt − st > 0,Ht] Pr(bt − st > 0||bt − st| = IBt,Ht).
Omitting subscripts on IB, the probability Pr(|bt − st| = IB|Ht) is independent of the
history and is given by























where B( , ) is the Bessel function of the ﬁrst order. When bt > st, the absolute value
of the price change is pt − pt−1. Using the transaction price law of motion, after some























A similar expression can be derived for bt < st. Since pt − pt−1 = 0 when bt = st, the
expected absolute value of the price change is given by E+[|∆pt||IB] + E−[|∆pt||IB] and














Pr(|bt − st| = IB|Ht)











Since β1/β0 > 1, the above expression increases in IB.
B.6 Proof of Proposition 5
We ﬁrst compute the expected absolute value of the price change conditional on the
realized number of transactions b + s = Vol; we use ∆pt( ) to express how the price




|∆pt(2b − Vol)|Pr(bt = b,st = Vol − b|Ht).
Traders’ decisions are independent, conditional on the asset’s true liquidation value, and















Using Vol = 2k and Vol = 2k + 1, we need to show that E2k+1[|∆pt|] − E2k[|∆pt|] > 0.
This is true for k = 0, and so in what follows we assume k ≥ 1. Rewrite E2k+1[|∆pt|] as
k X
b=0


























33The second sum can be expressed as a sum where s runs from 0 to k, with s = 2k +



















2k+1[|∆pt|] denotes the sum over negative net order ﬂows, bt < st, and E
+
2k+1[|∆pt|]
denotes the sum over positive net order ﬂows, bt > st.










2k[|∆pt|] = |∆pt(1)|(pt−1ρ(1 − ρ)



































































An analogous expression obtains for E
−
2k[|∆pt|]. Explicitly writing out |∆pt| using equation
(12) and noting that ρ/(1 − ρ) = β1/β0, we obtain for all 0 ≤ b ≤ k − 1:




2k−b + (1 − pt−1)ρ
2k−b(1 − ρ)
b+1￿




2k+1−b + (1 − pt−1)ρ
2k+1−b(1 − ρ)
b￿




2k[|∆pt|], all terms for b < k cancel and the
only remaining term is the one for b = k of E
+
2k+1[|∆pt|]. This term is positive as all the
arguments are non-negative and some are strictly positive. The sums over the positive




2k+1[|∆pt|] can be rewritten analogously.
34B.7 Proof of Proposition 7
The probability of there being Vol trades at time t is independent of the history and is
given by equation (B-7). The expected trading volume is thus E[bt + st|Ht] = ν(β0 + β1).
Further, the family of distributions of bt + st|Ht increases in ν in the sense of the ﬁrst












where the equality follows by exchanging the order of summation and diﬀerentiation.
Propositions 3 and 5 imply that the conditional expectations of the absolute values of the
order imbalance and price changes increase in realized volume. An increase in ν leads
to a ﬁrst order stochastic dominance shift in the distribution of volume, which in turns
implies an increase in E[|bt −st||Ht] and E[|∆pt||Ht]. Duration D(ν,γ1) decreases because
e−ν(1−γ1) = x decreases in ν and ∂
∂x
x
(1−x)2 > 0. ￿
B.8 Proof of Proposition 8










with the left-hand side intersecting the right-hand side from below at π > 1/2. Take
˜ θ ≥ θ. From Appendix A, if the quality distribution ˜ G( |θ) on [1/2,1] increases in θ in







Since the left-hand side and the right-hand side of (B-8) are strictly monotonic in π, their
intersection for θ is to the left of their intersection for ˜ θ.
(b) Equation (11) can be rewritten as (1 − π(θ))/π(θ) = β0(π(θ))/β1(π(θ)). By part (a),
π(θ) increases in θ, and thus β0(π(θ))/β1(π(θ)) decreases.
B.9 Proof of Proposition 9
(i) Expected volume increases. Expected volume is given by ν(β1+β0). From the proof
of the existence theorem, β1(θ) + β0(θ) = 1 +   − 2 G(π|θ). Thus we need to show that
G(π(˜ θ)|˜ θ) < G(π(θ)|θ) for θ < ˜ θ. Let ˜ θ = θ+∆θ with ∆θ small. We use subscripts θ and
35π for partial derivatives. A ﬁrst order Taylor approximation of G yields
G(π(θ + ∆θ),θ + ∆θ) = G(π(θ),θ) + Gθ(π(θ),θ)∆θ + Gπ(π(θ),θ)π
′(θ)∆θ.
We thus have to show that
(B-9) Gθ(π(θ),θ) + Gπ(π(θ),θ)   π
′(θ) < 0.
By Appendix A, when the quality distribution ˜ G( |θ) on [1/2,1] increases in θ in the
sense ﬁrst order stochastic dominance, then it holds that Gθ < 0 for π > 1/2. Yet Gπ =
g( |θ) ≥ 0 (for it is a density) and π′ > 0 (by Proposition 8).
The change in the threshold, π′(θ), is obtained from the equilibrium condition. From
the proof of the existence theorem we know that the equilibrium π(θ) solves


















The size of the last term depends on   and we will now eliminate it to establish a relation
that only depends on the primitive quality distribution. Reformulating (B-10),






Substituting back into the LHS of (B-9) and expressing it in terms of Ψ yields
Ψπ,θ(π(θ),θ) + Ψπ,π(π(θ),θ)
(2π(θ) − 1)Ψθ(π(θ),θ)
2Ψθ(π(θ),θ) − (2π(θ) − 1)Ψπ(π(θ),θ)
< 0.
As the denominator of the second term is positive, the above is equivalent to (⋆).
(ii) The expected order imbalance increases.
Claim (I): Given condition (⋆), the distribution of volume increases in θ the sense of
ﬁrst order stochastic dominance.
36Claim (II): The distribution of the order imbalance conditional on volume increases
in θ in the sense of of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance.
Using these claims, the proof obtains as follows. By Proposition 3, E[IB|bt + st =Vol,θ]












E[IB|bt + st = Vol,θl]Pr(Vol|θl) = E[IB|θl].
The ﬁrst inequality follows from Claim (I), and the second from Claim (II).
Proof of Claim (I): Deﬁne α(θ) := ν(β1 + β0). By Proposition 8, α′(θ) > 0. Using
equation (B-7), the cumulative distribution of volume is
Pr(Vol ≤ k) = e
−α
￿











The ﬁrst order eﬀect of a change in θ on this cdf is
∂
∂θ







Since Pr(Vol ≤ k) ց in θ for all k, we have FOSD.
Proof of Claim (II): Consider function ρ = β1/(β1 + β0) as deﬁned in the proof of
Proposition 3. By Proposition 8, ρ′(θ) > 0. Now suppose that Vol = 2k, i.e. volume is
even (the case for odd volume, Vol = 2k + 1 is analogous). To prove that for ﬁxed Vol,
the distribution of the order imbalance satisﬁes FOSD, we need to show that
Pr(IB ≤ 2i|Vol = 2k) ց in θ for all 0 ≤ i < k.
The relevant probabilities for the order imbalance have been derived in the proof of
Proposition 3. Suppose that i = 0. Then Pr(IB = 0|Vol = 2k) = ρk(1 − ρ)k (2k)!
k!k! .












k−1 (1 − 2ρ) < 0.
















Computing the derivative and rearranging, we obtain
∂
∂ρ
Pr(IB ≤ 2i|Vol = 2k) =
(2k)!











where the last step follows as ρ > 1/2. Finally observe that Pr(IB ≤ 2i|Vol = 2k) = 1
for i = k. Thus Pr(IB ≤ 2i|Vol = 2k) ց in ρ and since ρ ց in θ, we have that
Pr(IB ≤ 2i|Vol = 2k) increases in θ in the sense of ﬁrst order stochastic dominance.
(iii) The expected price variability increases. As the proof of Proposition 5 shows,
the expected price variability, E[|∆pt||θ] employs the same probabilities as the expected
order imbalance, E[IB|θ] for ﬁxed volume. As the distribution of volume satisﬁes FOSD,
the result is analogous to part (ii).
(iv) Duration decreases. As βv + σv + γv = 1, when βv + σv increases γv decreases.
B.10 Proof of Proposition 10 (Noise Trading)
(a) As   increases, the left-hand side of (B-3), which implicitly deﬁnes π, shifts to the
right and thus the root π shifts to the right, too.
(b) As argued in the Proof of Proposition 7, expected trading volume is proportional to
β1 + β0. Using Step 2(i) of the proof of the existence theorem,




Since π increases in  , d/(d )G(π( )) > 0. Thus d/(d )(β1( ) + β0( )) < 0 and trading
volume declines.
(c) As in Step (iv) in the proof of Proposition 9, duration increases.
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39Result Variable Shift Observable Reaction
Existing evidence or suggested
empirical proxies for unobservables
Corollary 1 net order ﬂow ր price ր
Jones, Kaul, and Lipson (1994),
Brown, Walsh, and Yuen (1997),
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002)
Proposition 2 past net order ﬂow > 0 average future net order ﬂow > 0
Hasbrouck and Ho (1987),
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002)
Proposition 3 (a) past order imbalances ր future order imbalances independent N/A
Proposition 3 (b) volume ր order imbalance ր
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002),
Chan and Fong (2000)
Proposition 4 order imbalance ր average absolute price change ր
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002),
Chan and Fong (2000)
Proposition 5 volume ր average absolute price change ր
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2002),
Chan and Fong (2000),
Gallant, Rossi, and Tauchen (1992)
Proposition 7 entry rate ր
average volume ր
average order imbalance ր
average price changes ր
duration ց
causes for changes in entry rate:
index inclusion, international market opening
ﬁnancial deregulation, cross-listing
Propositions 8 & 9 information quality ր
price impact ր
average volume ր
average order imbalance ր
average price changes ր
duration ց
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008),
causes for changes in information quality:
new disclosure rules, changes in analyst
coverage, changes in information technology,
changes in ownership structure (hedge funds
rather than mutual funds), development
of a new analysis tool, improvements in
analysts’ earnings forecasts
Proposition 10 informed trading ր
average volume ց
duration ր
(numerically) price changes ր
causes for changes in the proportion of
informed trading: changes in ownership
structure (hedge funds rather than retail),
market changes that trigger more retail
participation or day trading
Table 1: Empirical Predictions of the Model
4
0